THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  . 


AN  ESSAY 


A.   F.   MORRISON 


TJ1TI7BRSITT 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


AN  ESSAY 


A.   F.   MORRISON 


Read  before  the  Chit-Chat  Club,  of  San  Francisco, 
December  9,   1895 

- t '"»       >.^JTJ^5^^. 

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3I7BRSITT 


SAN  FRANCISCO 

C.  A.  MURDOCK  &  Co.,  PRINTERS 

1896 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 

(Read  before  the  Chit-Chat  Club,  of  San  Francisco,  December  9,  1895.) 


THE  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  is  understood  to-day,  is 
something  different  from  what  it  was  at  the  time 
of  its  declaration  by  President  Monroe.  The  Monroe 
declaration,  aside  from  the  political  events  that  imme- 
diately called  it  forth,  was  the  embodiment  of  a  national 
sentiment  which  had  grown  and  developed  among  our 
people.  But  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  is  understood 
to-day,  is  much  more  comprehensive  than  the  simple 
declaration  made  by  Monroe.  It  represents  a  larger 
growth  and  a  further  development. 

What  that  doctrine  is,  has  never  been  authoritatively 
defined.  Our  understanding  of  what  it  is,  and  its  scope, 
must  be  gathered  from  the  history  of  our  country  and 
the  declarations  of  our  Presidents  and  other  distinguished 
statesmen,  as  precedents. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  "balance  of  power"  with 
Europe,  we  know  that  our  nation  believes  that  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  necessary  to  our 
safety  and  welfare.  And,  like  the  "balance  of  power," 
the  doctrine  seems  to  be  flexible  and  elastic  ;  and  doubt- 
less the  scope  of  its  assertion  will,  in  a  large  measure, 
depend  upon  the  circumstances  under  which  it  may  be 
invoked. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  an  intelligent  under- 
standing of  this  doctrine  must  be  derived  from  a  review 
of  the  events  which  constitute  its  history. 

As  the  people  of  the  United  States  emerged  from  the 


—  4  — 

period  of  the  Revolution  and  the  Confederation,  and  as 
the  spirit  and  sentiment  of  nationality  gained  deeper 
root,  the  vision  of  a  mighty  destiny  grew  upon  them 
until  it  became  an  abiding  conviction.  As  the  country 
grew  and  prospered  under  a  democratic  constitution, 
original  to  our  people,  and  without  a  prototype,  the 
further  conviction  took  deep  and  vigorous  root  that  this 
nation  had  a  mission  to  perform  in  spreading  the  light 
and  exemplifying  the  blessings  of  democratic  institutions 
among  the  nations  of  the  earth,  and  especially  among 
the  peoples  who  inhabited  these  American  continents. 
As  the  result  of  two  fierce  wars  with  the  most  powerful 
nation  of  the  world,  we  early  had  what  may  be  called  a 
"past,"  which  was  filled  with  national  heroes  and  with 
the  traditions  of  heroic  deeds.  The  traditions  of  those 
wars  kindled  and  fanned  the  fires  of  patriotism,  while 
the  consciousness  of  a  great  mission  and  the  vision  of  a 
great  destiny  gave  a  direction  and  a  scope  to  that 
patriotism  which  made  it  apostolic  and  extra-territorial, 
so  far  as  the  immediate  national  boundaries  were  con- 
cerned. Besides  all  this,  the  American  people  had  made 
their  country  an  asylum  for  those  who  were  disaffected 
with  the  tyranny  and  harsh  conditions  of  the  Old  World. 
The  fact  that  they  were  maintaining  such  an  asylum 
under  the  very  eyes  of  the  reactionary  despotisms  then 
pervading  the  Old  World  made  the  people  of  this  nation 
feel  conscious,  and  perhaps  rightly  so,  that  the  success 
and  example  of  their  free  institutions  were  ungrateful 
things  in  the  eyes  of  the  Old  World  despotisms.  As  a 
result  of  this  consciousness,  our  people  grew  suspicious, 
apprehensive,  and  jealous  of  all  political  influences  that 
might  emanate  from  the  Old  World.  They  felt  that  the 
preservation  of  their  own  institutions  depended  on  their 
holding  aloof  from  entangling  alliances  with  Europe,  and 


in  discouraging  European  intervention  in  the  political 
affairs  of  the  American  continents. 

A  solemn  and  influential  expression  of  the  first  of 
these  feelings  was  given  in  Washington's  farewell 
address;  and  the  declaration  there  made  has  profoundly 
affected  the  policy  of  this  country.  Washington  said : 

"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign 
nations  is,  in  extending  pur  commercial  relations,  to  have 
with  them  as  little  political  connection  as  possible.  So 
far  as  we  have  already  formed  engagements,  let  them  be 
fulfilled  with  perfect  good  faith.  Here  let  us  stop. 

"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to  us 
have  none,  or  a  very  remote,  relation.  Hence  she 
must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of 
which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence, 
therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves, 
by  artificial  ties,  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her 
politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of 
her  friendships  or  enmities. 

"Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and 
enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  If  we  remain 
one  people,  under  an  efficient  government,  the  period 
is  not  far  off  when  we  may  defy  material  injury  from 
external  annoyance ;  when  we  may  take  such  an  attitude 
as  will  cause  the  neutrality  we  may  at  any  time  resolve 
upon  to  be  scrupulously  respected;  when  belligerent 
nations,  under  the  impossibility  of  making  acquisitions 
upon  us,  will  not  lightly  hazard  the  giving  us  provoca- 
tion ;  when  we  may  choose  peace  or  war,  as  our  interest, 
guided  by  justice,  shall  counsel. 

"Why  forego  the  advantage  of  so  peculiar  a  situation  ? 
Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground  ?  Why, 
by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of 
Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils 
of  European  ambition,  rivalship,  interest,  humor,  or 
caprice?" 

But  the  first  distinctively  American  territorial  system 
or  policy  —  a  policy  that  would  exclude  European  influ- 
ences from  the  political  affairs  of  this  continent, — seems 


—  6  — 

to  have  been  conceived  and  developed  by  Jefferson. 
When  Secretary  of  State,  in  Washington's  Cabinet,  he 
labored  persistently  to  acquire  from  Spain  the  right  to 
the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  also  the 
cession  of  an  entrepot  at  the  mouth  of  that  river. 
During  the  time  these  negotiations  were  pending,  a 
rupture  between  England  and  Spain  became  imminent, 
and  Jefferson  became  fearful  that  England  would  take 
advantage  of  such  a  war  to  seize  the  Spanish  possessions 
lying  on  our  border,  including  Florida  and  Louisiana. 

On  August  12,  1790,  he  wrote  to  Gouverneur  Morris, 
the  United  States  informal  agent  in  Great  Britain,  a  letter, 
in  which  he  says  that  the  conduct  of  the  British  Ministry 
proves  that — 

"They  view  a  war  as  very  possible;  and  some 
symptoms  indicate  designs  against  the  Spanish  posses- 
sions adjoining  us.  The  consequence  of  their  acquiring 
all  the  country  from  the  St.  Croix  to  the  St.  Mary's  are 
too  obvious  to  you  to  need  development.  You  will 
readily  see  the  dangers  which  would  then  environ  us. 
We  wish  you,  therefore,  to  intimate  to  them  that  we 
cannot  be  indifferent  to  enterprises  of  this  kind.  That 
we  should  contemplate  a  change  of  neighbors  with 
extreme  uneasiness ;  and  that  a  due  balance  on  our 
borders  is  not  less  desirable  to  us,  than  a  balance  of 
power  in  Europe  has  always  appeared  to  them.  We 
wish  to  be  neutral,  and  we  will  be  so,  if  they  will  execute 
the  treaty  fairly  and  attempt  no  conquests  adjoining  us." 

On  October  29,  1808,  while  we  were  surrounded  by 
the  possessions  of  European  powers  on  all  sides,  and 
before  the  Spanish  Colonies  had  revolted,  Jefferson, 
then  President,  wrote  to  William  C.  C.  Claiborne,  the 
Governor  of  the  Territory  of  Orleans,  as  follows : 

"The  truth  is  that  the  patriots  of  Spain  have  no 
warmer  friends  than  the  administration  of  the  United 
States;  but  it  is  our  duty  to  say  nothing  and  to  do 


—  7  — 

nothing  for  or  against  either.  If  they  succeed,  we  shall 
be  satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  remain  in  their 
present  dependence ;  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them  in 
that  of  either  France  or  England,  politically  or  com- 
mercially. We  consider  their  interests  and  ours  as  the 
same,  and  the  object  of  both  must  be  to  exclude  all 
European  influence  from  this  hemisphere.  .  .  . 

"  These  are  sentiments  which  I  wish  you  to  express  to 
any  proper  characters  of  either  of  these  two  countries, 
and  particularly  that  we  have  nothing  more  at  heart  than 
their  friendship.'* 

On  August  4,  1820,  in  a  letter  to  William  Short, 
Jefferson  speaks  of  conversations  which  he  had  lately 
had  with  the  Abbe*  Correa,  who  for  a  number  of  years 
had  been  Portuguese  Minister  at  Washington,  but  who 
had  lately  been  appointed  by  the  Government  of  Portugal 
as  Minister  to  Brazil ;  and  he  says  : 

"From  many  conversations  with  him,  I  hope  he  sees, 
and  will  promote  in  his  new  situation,  the  advantages  of 
a  cordial  fraternization  among  all  the  American  nations, 
and  the  importance  of  their  coalescing  in  an  American 
system  of  policy  totally  independent  of  and  unconnected 
with  that  of  Europe.  The  day  is  not  distant  when  we  may 
formally  require  a  meridian  of  partition  through  the  • 
ocean  which  separates  the  two  hemispheres,  on  the 
hither  side  of  which  no  European  gun  shall  ever  be 
heard,  nor  American  on  the  other ;  and  when  during  the 
rage  of  the  eternal  wars  of  Europe,  the  lion  and  the 
lamb,  within  our  regions,  shall  lie  down  together  in 
peace.  .  .  .  The  principles  of  society  there  and 
here,  then,  are  radically  different,  and  I  hope  no  Amer- 
ican patriot  will  ever  lose  sight  of  the  essential  policy  of 
interdicting  in  the  seas  and  territories  of  both  Americas 
the  ferocious  and  sanguinary  contests  of  Europe. " 

But  Jefferson's  ideas  were,  even  at  this  time,  somewhat 
advanced,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following  declaration, 
made  this  same  year  (1820)  by  that  sterling  American 
statesman,  John  Quincy  Adams.  Mr.  Adams  was  then 


' 

"* 


Secretary  of  State.  He  tells  us,  in  his  diary,  that  this 
same  Abbe*  Correa,  mentioned  in  Jefferson's  letter  to 
Short,  had  suggested  to  him  that  the  United  States  and 
Portugal,  as  "the  two  great  powers  of  the  Western 
hemisphere  "  should  concert  together  a  grand  American 
system.  But  Mr.  Adams,  as  his  biographer  says,  after 
giving  vent  to  some  contemptuous  merriment,  replied 
"with  a  just  and  serious  pride": 

"As  to  an  American  system,  we  have  it;  we  con- 
stitute the  whole  of  it;  there  is  no  community  of  interests 
or  of  principles  between  North  and  South  America." 

But,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Adams 
underwent  a  great  change  within  the  next  three  years. 

About  this  time,  events  were  fast  shaping  themselves, 
both  in  the  Old  and  in  the  New  World,  in  a  way  that 
brought  all  of  the  peoples  of  this  hemisphere  into  a 
closer  sympathy  with  each  other,  and  made  them 
anxious  to  see  both  continents  emancipated  from 
European  influences. 

The  revolutions  in  the  Spanish-American  colonies, 
which  commenced  about  1810,  had  become  so  practically 
successful  by  March,  1822,  that  our  Government  recog- 
nized those  colonies  as  independent  states.  Spain, 
however,  continued  to  make  desultory  attempts  to  recon- 
quer them  for  many  years  after.  The  revolted  colonies 
naturally  looked  to  us,  who  had  so  recently  thrown  off 
the  European  yoke,  for  sympathy  and  support.  The 
eloquence  of  Henry  Clay  had  roused  in  their  favor  the 
sympathy  of  this  nation;  and,  while  our  Government 
maintained  a  strict  neutrality,  many  were  the  privateers, 
fitted  out  in  American  ports,  which  gave  unofficial  succor 
to  the  cause  of  Spanish- American  independence. 

Such  a  change,  too,  had  been  worked  in  the  official 
life  of  the  nation  that  we  find  Mr.  Adams,  the  Secretary 


—  9  — 

of  State  who,  in  1820,  had  told  the  Portuguese  Minister 
that  there  was  "no  community  of  interests  or  of  prin- 
ciples between  North  and  South  America,"  writing  now 
to  Mr.  Rush,  our  Minister  to  England,  under  date  of 
July  2,  1823,  as  follows  : 

"These  independent  nations  [that  is,  those  of  South 
America  and  Mexico]  will  possess  the  rights  incident  to 
that  condition,  and  their  territories  will,  of  course,  be 
subject  to  no  exclusive  right  of  navigation  in  their 
vicinity,  or  of  access  to  them  by  any  foreign  nation.  A 
necessary  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  will  be, 
that  the  American  continents  henceforth  will  no  longer 
be  subject  to  colonization.  Occupied  by  civilized  nations, 
they  will  bfe  accessible  to  Europeans  and  each  other  on 
that  footing  alone ;  and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  in  every  part 
of  it,  will  remain  open  to  the  navigation  of  all  nations  in 
like  manner  with  the  Atlantic." 

And  again,  on  July  22,  1823,  in  writing  to  Mr.  Middle- 
ton,  our  Minister  to  Russia,  on  the  Russian  claims  to  the 
Northwestern  Territory,  Mr.  Adams  said : 

"There  can  perhaps  be  no  better  time  for  saying 
frankly  and  explicitly  to  the  Russian  Government  that 
the  future  peace  of  the  world,  and  the  interests  of  Russia 
herself,  cannot  be  promoted  by  Russian  settlements 
upon  any  part  of  the  American  continent.  With  the 
exception  of  the  British  establishments  north  of  the 
United  States,  the  remainder  of  both  American  con- 
tinents must  henceforth  be  left  to  the  management  of 
American  hands.  It  cannot  possibly  be  the  purpose 
of  Russia  to  form  extensive  colonial  establishments  in 
America.  The  new  American  republics  willl  be  as 
impatient  of  a  Russian  neighbor  as  the  United  States." 

But  a  more  powerful  influence  than  sympathy  for  the 
struggling  patriots  of  Spanish  America  awakened  our 
people  and  statesmen  to  the  dangers  as  well  as  the 
undesirability  of  European  neighborhood  and  influence 
on  this  hemisphere.  It  was  the  threatened  armed  inter- 


ference,  on  behalf  of  Spain,  and  against  her  colonies,  by 
the  most  powerful  league  of  European  states  that  ever 
existed.  And  the  danger  was  still  further  heightened  by 
the  possibility  that,  as  the  result  of  such  interference,  we 
might  no  longer  have  weak  and  impoverished  Spain  for 
our  neighbor ;  but,  instead  of  her,  we  might  find  England 
in  Cuba,  commanding  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  River,  France  in  Mexico,  and 
Russia  west  of  the  Mississippi. 

After  the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  and  while  the  Allies 
were  still  in  possession  of  France,  the  Emperors  of 
Russia  and  Austria  and  the  King  of  Prussia  signed  a 
treaty,  which  is  known  in  history  as  the  treaty  of  the 
Holy  Alliance. 

The  treaty  was  signed  September  26,  1815.  The 
Alliance  was  finally  joined  by  all  the  European  states 
except  England  and  the  Pope.  The  avowed  purpose  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  was  to  secure  the  government  of  states 
in  accordance  with  the  precepts  of  the  Christian  religion; 
and  to  this  end  the  allied  monarchs,  "looking  upon 
themselves  as  delegated  by  Providence"  to  rule  over 
their  respective  countries,  pledged  themselves  to  "lend 
to  one  another,  on  all  occasions,  and  in  all  places,  assist- 
ance, aid,  and  succor."  The  real  purposes  of  the  Alli- 
ance seem  to  have  been  to  check  and  suppress  the 
growth  of  liberal  and  republican  ideas. 

The  members  of  the  Alliance  held  a  number  of  meet- 
ings or  congresses  from  time  to  time.  Among  the  most 
important  of  these  congresses  was  that  convened  at 
Troppau,  in  Silesia,  in  October,  1820,  and  which  removed 
later  in  the  same  year  to  Laybach,  in  Styria.  By  its  reso- 
lutions, at  Troppau,  the  Alliance  placed  "revolt"  and 
"crime"  in  the  same  category;  and  it  further  resolved — 


"that  the  powers  have  an  undoubted  right  to  take  a 
hostile  attitude  in  regard  to  those  states  in  which  the  over- 
throw of  the  government  may  operate  as  an  example;" 

thus  announcing,  as  a  principle,  the  right  of  the  Alliance 
to  forcibly  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  states. 
Later,  at  Laybach,  the  Alliance  announced  the  prin- 
ciple that  all  popular  and  constitutional  rights  are  held 
as  grants  from  the  crown,  and  not  otherwise;  and  in  the 
spring  of  1821,  the  Congress  addressed  a  circular  to 
the  foreign  representatives  of  the  assembled  sovereigns, 
in  which  it  declared  — 

"that  useful  and  necessary  changes  in  legislation  and 
in  the  administration  of  states  ought  to  emanate  from 
the  free  will  and  intelligent  and  well-weighed  con- 
viction of  those  whom  God  has  rendered  responsible  for 
power.  All  that  deviates  from  this  line  necessarily  leads 
to  disorder,  commotions,  and  evils  far  more  insufferable 
than  those  which  they  pretend  to  remedy";  and  it 
denounced  as  "equally  null  and  disallowed  by  the 
public  law  of  Europe,  any  pretended  reform  effected  by 
revolt  and  open  force." 

As  Webster  said,  this  was  the  "old  doctrine  of  the 
divine  right  of  kings,  advanced  by  new  advocates,  and 
sustained  by  a  formidable  array  of  power." 

Under  the  sanction  of  this  Congress,  Austria  forcibly 
suppressed  popular  revolutionary  movements  in  Pied- 
mont and  Naples.  In  the  meantime,  in  1820,  in  Spain, 
the  constitutional,  or  liberal,  party  had  gained  the 
ascendency,  and  had  compelled  Ferdinand  the  Seventh 
to  accept  a  liberal  constitution. 

At  a  congress  of  the  Alliance,  held  at  Verona  in 
October,  1822,  this  Spanish  revolution  was  the  chief  topic 
of  consideration  ;  and  from  this  congress  the  Alliance 
issued  a  circular  in  which  it  announced  its  determination 
"to  repel  the  maxim  of  rebellion,  in  whatever  place  and 


—  12  — 

under  whatever  form  it  might  show  itself";  and  a  secret 
treaty  was  signed,  in  which  the  Allies  mutually  pledged 
themselves  "to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  represen- 
tative governments"  in  Europe,  and  to  adopt  such 
measures  as  should  destroy  the  " liberty  of  the  press." 

When  the  Congress  of  Verona  adjourned,  it  was  with 
the  secret  understanding  that  France  should  invade 
Spain,  set  aside  the  new  constitutional  government,  and 
restore  Ferdinand  to  his  former  despotism.  France 
entered  Spain  with  an  army  of  100,000  men,  and 
succeeded  in  her  task,  early  in  1823.  England  protested 
vigorously  against  this  interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  Spain,  but  went  no  further;  although  the  popular 
sympathy  in  England  with  the  Spanish  nation  was  so 
strong  that  the  incident  came  near  leading  to  war.  The 
English  statesmen  of  the  day  were  too  prudent,  however, 
to  wish  a  war  with  the  Alliance,  then  in  the  zenith  of  its 
power. 

When  France  had  destroyed  Spanish  liberty,  Ferdi- 
nand then  wished  the  Alliance  to  assist  Spain  to  recon- 
quer the  revolted  colonies  in  the  New  World.  Some  of 
the  most  powerful  members  of  the  Alliance  were  agree- 
able to  the  enterprise.  It  was  evident  that  unless  Spain 
received  such  assistance  her  colonies  would  be  lost  to 
her  forever;  and  she  herself  would  have  been  willing 
to  reward  the  powers  who  might  assist  her  by  ceding 
to  them  part  of  the  territory  recovered.  It  was  known 
that  France  coveted  Cuba  as  her  reward  for  what  she 
had  already  done  in  restoring  Ferdinand's  despotism, 
and  that  she  also  expected  to  get  Mexico  as  her  reward 
for  her  assistance  in  the  new  enterprise.  Russia  would 
probably  take  the  Pacific  Coast. 

The  agitated  and  delicate  condition  of  affairs  at  this 
time,  both  in  the  Old  and  New  World,  is  shown  by  the  fol- 


lowing  incident  touching  the  Island  of  Cuba:  England, 
being  aware  of  the  designs  of  France  on  that  island,  had 
determined  to  anticipate  France,  by  sending  a  squadron 
to  take  possession  of  Cuba.  About  this  time,  also,  the 
domestic  situation  in  Cuba,  where  the  people  were 
divided  in  sympathy  between  the  party  of  the  king  and 
the  party  of  the  Cortes,  together  with  constant  fears  of 
slave  uprisings,  became  so  intolerable  that  many  Cubans 
looked  to  the  United  States,  and  many  to  England,  as  a 
means  of  escape  from  the  desperate  condition  of  the 
island.  In  this  state  of  affairs  our  Government  was 
informed  by  the  French  Minister  at  Washington  that 
his  Government  had  positive  information  of  designs  by 
England  upon  Cuba. 

Mr.  Rush,  our  Minister  to  England,  was  instructed  to 
notify  the  British  Government  of  the  existence  of  such 
rumors,  and  that  the  United  States  could  not  see  with 
indifference  the  possession  of  Cuba  by  any  European 
power  other  than  Spain  —  a  declaration  suggestive  of 
the  later  Monroe  Doctrine.  Mr.  Canning,  on  behalf  of 
the  British  Government,  disavowed  any  intention  to 
take  Cuba;  but,  at  the  same  time,  he  declared  that  his 
Government  would  not  see  with  indifference  the  occupa- 
tion of  that  island  by  either  France  or  the  United  States; 
and  he  proposed  an  understanding,  without  formal  con- 
vention, between  the  British,  French,  and  American 
Governments,  that  Cuba  should  be  left  in  the  possession 
of  Spain.  President  Monroe  assented  to  this,  leaving 
England  to  secure  a  similar  assent  from  France.  Such 
was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Europe  and  America 
during  Mr.  Monroe's  second  administration. 

The  course  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  Europe,  and  the 
possibility  of  its  interference  in  behalf  of  Spain  for  the 
recovery  of  her  lost  colonies,  excited  grave  apprehen- 


—  14  — 

sion  in  this  country.  The  possibility  of  having  such 
unwelcome  neighbors  as  France  or  England  in  Cuba, 
France  in  Mexico,  and  Russia  west  of  the  Mississippi, 
made  our  statesmen  realize  that  the  day  might  not  be 
far  off  when  "  our  detached  and  distant  situation,"  and 
the  ''advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation,"  spoken  of 
by  Washington,  might  be  things  of  the  past ;  and  that  the 
theater  of  the  eternal  strifes  of  Europe  might  be  trans- 
ferred to  our  own  borders,  if  not  to  our  own  soil.  If 
such  things  came  to  pass,  how  could  we  escape  "inter- 
weaving our  destiny"  with  Europe,  which  Washington 
so  much  feared? 

Luckily  for  us,  England,  with  her  great  sea  power, 
found  her  interests  at  this  time  lying  in  the  same  direc- 
tion as  our  own. 

We  had  already  acknowledged  the  independence  of 
the  revolted  ^Spanish  colonies.  England  would  have 
liked  to  do  the  same  thing;  but  she  feared  such  a  course 
would  involve  her  in  a  war  with  the  Holy  Alliance. 
Since  the  revolt  of  those  colonies  and  the  abolition  of 
the  exclusive  colonial  monopolies  of  Spain,  a  large  and 
valuable  commerce  had  grown  up  between  the  colonies 
and  England.  A  return  of  the  colonies  to  their  former 
allegiance,  or  a  transfer  of  their  possession  to  any  of  the 
allied  powers,  would  almost  inevitably  restore  such 
monopolies,  and  thus  deprive  England  of  a  large  part  of 
her  rich  trade. 

England  was  satisfied  that,  if  left  to  themselves,  the 
colonies  could  maintain  their  independence;  and  she 
was,  therefore,  very  anxious  that  the  Alliance  should  not 
interfere.  Accordingly,  in  August  and  September,  1823, 
Mr.  Canning  proposed  to  our  Minister,  Mr.  Rush,  that 
the  United  States  and  England  should  make  "a  joint 
declaration  before  Europe"  to  the  effect  that  while 


—  15  — 

neither  England  nor  the  United  States  desired  any  por- 
tions of  the  Spanish  colonies  for  themselves,  and  while 
they  would  not  obstruct  any  amicable  relations  between 
Spain  and  her  colonies,  they,  nevertheless,  could  not  see 
with  indifference  the  intervention  of  any  foreign  power, 
or  the  transfer  to  such  power  of  any  of  those  colonies. 

Mr.  Rush  replied  that  his  instructions  did  not  authorize 
him  to  take  such  a  step,  but,  nevertheless,  he  would 
assume  the  responsibility,  if  the  British  Government 
would  acknowledge  the  independence  of  the  colonies. 
The  British  Government  was  not  yet  ready,  however,  to 
go  as  far  as  that.  Mr.  Rush  reported  these  conversa- 
tions to  his  Government.  President  Monroe  imme- 
diately submitted  the  matter  to  Jefferson  and  Madison. 
Jefferson  replied  to  Monroe  on  October  24,  1823;  and 
his  letter  is  so  important  in  the  history  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  so  excellent,  that  I  will  give  it  in  full : 

"MONTICELLO,  Oct.  24,   1823. 

"DEAR  SIR:  The  question  presented  by  the  letters 
you  have  sent  me  is  the  most  momentous  which  has 
ever  been  offered  to  my  contemplation  since  that  of 
Independence.  That  made  us  a  nation;  this  sets  our 
compass  and  points  the  course  which  we  are  to  steer 
through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us.  And  never 
could  we  -embark  upon  it  under  circumstances  more 
auspicious.  Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should 
be,  never  to  tangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe. 
Our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with 
cis-Atlantic  affairs.  America,  North  and  South,  has  a 
set  of  interests  distinct  from  those  of  Europe,  and  pecu- 
liarly her  own.  She  should,  therefore,  have  a  system  of 
her  own,  separate  and  apart  from  that  of  Europe.  While 
the  last  is  laboring  to  become  the  domicile  of  despotism, 
our  endeavor  should  surely  be  to  make  our  hemisphere 
that  of  freedom. 

"One  nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  this 
pursuit ;  she  now  offers  to  lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us 


— 16  — 

in  it.  By  acceding  to  her  proposition,  we  detach  her 
from  the  bands,  bring  her  mighty  weight  into  the  scale 
of  free  government,  and  emancipate  a  continent  at  one 
stroke,  which  might  otherwise  linger  long  in  doubt  and 
difficulty.  Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us 
the  most  harm  of  any  one  of  all  on  earth,  and  with  her 
on  our  side  we  need  not  fear  the  whole  world.  With 
her,  then,  we  should  sedulously  cherish  a  cordial  friend- 
ship, arid  nothing  would  tend  more  to  knit  our  affections 
than  to  be  fighting  once  more  side  by  side  in  the  same 
cause.  Not  that  I  would  purchase  even  her  amity  at  the 
price  of  taking  part  in  her  wars. 

"  But  the  war  in  which  the  present  proposition  might 
engage  us,  should  that  be  its  consequence,  is  not  her  war, 
but  ours.  Its  object  is  to  introduce  and  establish  the 
American  system  of  keeping  out  of  our  land  all  foreign 
powers,  of  never  permitting  those  of  Europe  to  inter- 
meddle with  the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is  to  maintain 
our  own  principle,  not  to  depart  from  it.  And  if,  to 
facilitate  this,  we  can  effect  a  division  in  the  body  of  the 
European  powers,  and  draw  over  to  our  side  its  most 
powerful  member,  surely  we  should  do  it.  But  I  am 
clearly  of  Mr.  Canning's  opinion  —  that  it  will  prevent 
instead  of  provoke  war.  With  Great  Britain  withdrawn 
from  their  scale  and  shifted  into  that  of  our  two  con7 
tinents,  all  Europe  combined  would  not  undertake  such 
a  war.  For  how  would  they  propose  to  get  at  either 
enemy  without  superior  fleets  ?  Nor  is  the  occasion  to 
be  slighted  which  this  proposition  offers,  of  declaring 
our  protest  against  the  atrocious  violations  of  the  rights 
of  nations,  by  the  interference  of  any  one  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another,  so  flagitiously  begun  by  Bonaparte, 
and  now  continued  by  the  equally  lawless  Alliance, 
calling  itself  Holy. 

"But  we  have  first  to  ask  ourselves  a  question:  Do 
we  wish  to  acquire  to  our  own  confederacy  any  one  or 
more  of  the  Spanish  provinces  ?  I  candidly  confess  that 
I  have  ever  looked  on  Cuba  as  the  most  interesting 
addition  which  could  ever  be  made  to  our  system  of 
States.  The  control  which,  with  Florida  Point,  this 
island  would  give  us  over  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
countries  and  isthmus  bordering  on  it,  as  well  as  all 


—  17  — 

those  whose  waters  flow  into  it,  would  fill  up  the 
measure  of  our  political  well-being.  Yet,  as  I  am  sen- 
sible that  this  can  never  be  obtained,  even  with  her  own 
consent,  but  by  war,  and  its  independence,  which  is 
our  second  interest  (and  especially  its  independence^  of 
England),  can  be  secured  without  it,  I  have  no  hesitation 
in  abandoning  my  first  wish  to  future  chances,  and 
accepting  its  independence,  with  peace  and  the  friend- 
ship ot  England,  rather  than  its  association  at  the  expense 
of  war  and  her  enmity. 

"I  could  honestly,  therefore,  join  in  the  declaration 
proposed,  that  we  aim  not  at  the  acquisition  of  any  of 
those  possessions,  that  we  will  not  stand  in  the  way  of 
any  amicable  arrangement  between  them  and  the  mother 
country;  but  that  we  will  oppose  with  all  our  means  the 
forcible  interposition  of  any  other  power,  as  auxiliary, 
stipendiary,  or  under  any  other  form  or  pretext,  and 
most  especially  their  transfer  to  any  power  by  conquest, 
cession,  or  acquisition  in  any  other  way.  I  should  think 
it,  therefore,  advisable  that  the  Executive  should  encour- 
age the  British  Government  to  a  continuance  in  the  dis- 
positions expressed  in  these  letters  by  an  assurance  of 
his  concurrence  with  them  as  far  as  his  authority  goes ; 
and  that,  as  it  may  lead  to  war,  the  declaration  of  which 
requires  an  act  of  Congress,  the  case  shall  be  laid  before 
them  for  consideration  at  their  first  meeting,  and  under 
the  reasonable  aspect  in  which  it  is  seen  by  himself. 

"  I  have  been  so  long  weaned  from  political  subjects, 
and  have  so  long  ceased  to  take  any  interest  in  them, 
that  I  am  sensible  I  am  not  qualified  to  offer  opinions 
on  them  worthy  of  any  attention.  But  the  question  now 
proposed  involves  consequences  so  lasting  and  effects  so 
decisive  of  our  future  destinies  as  to  rekindle  all  the 
interest  I  have  heretofore  felt  on  such  occasions,  and  to 
induce  me  to  the  hazard  of  opinions  which  will  prove 
only  my  wish  to  contribute  still  my  mite  toward  anything 
which  may  be  useful  to  our  country.  And,  praying  you 
to  accept  it  at  only  what  it  is  worth,  I  add  the  assurance 
of  my  constant  and  affectionate  friendship  and  respect." 

Mr.  Madison  also  approved  of  co-operation  with  Eng- 
land in  making  such  a  declaration,  but  he  believed  that 


—  iS  — 

Mr.  Canning's  proposal,  though  made  with  an  air  of  con- 
sultation as  well  as  concert,  was  founded  on  a  predeter- 
mination to  take  the  course  marked  out,  whatever  might 
be  the  stand  taken  by  our  Government. 

When  the  matter  came  up  in  Monroe's  Cabinet,  some 
were  so  cautious  as  to  hesitate  about  the  advisability  of 
making  the  declaration  at  all,  as  it  might  lead  to  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Adams  tells  us,  in  his  diary, 
that  Mr.  Calhoun  believed  that  the  Holy  Alliance  "  had 
an  ultimate  eye  on  us;  that  they  would,  if  not  resisted, 
subdue  South  America.  .  .  .  Violent  parties  would 
arise  in  this  country,  one  for  and  one  against  them,  and 
we  should  have  to  fight  on  our  own  shores  for  our  own 
institutions";  and  he  believed  in  authorizing  Mr.  Rush 
to  join  England  in  making  the  declaration.  Mr.  Adams 
opposed  our  making  a  joint  declaration  with  England, 
except  on  the  basis  of  England's  acknowledging  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Spanish- American  states.  He  did  not 
believe  that  the  Alliance  would  try  to  establish  a  mon- 
archy among  us;  but,  at  most,  if  they  should  subdue  the 
Spanish  provinces,  they  would,  after  partitioning  them 
among  themselves,  recolonize  them.  He  believed  Russia 
might  take  California,  Peru,  and  Chili;  France  might 
take  Mexico;  and  England,  if  she  could  not  resist  the 
course  of  events,  would  at  least  take  Cuba  as  her  share 
in  the  scramble. 

If  we  should  join  England  in  such  a  declaration  as  pro- 
posed, we  would  occupy  an  uncomfortable  and  anoma- 
lous position,  with  England  as  our  neighbor  in  Cuba  and 
France  in  Mexico.  Mr.  Adams  strenuously  insisted  that, 
unless  England  should  put  herself  on  record  and  recog- 
nize the  independence  of  those  colonies,  we  should 
make  our  own  declaration  independently  of  her.  As 
events  turned  out,  it  is  fortunate  that  Mr.  Adams'  views 


—  I9  - 

prevailed,  and  fortunate  also  that  England  delayed 
recognizing  those  states.  Otherwise,  instead  of  a  distinct- 
ively American  and  patriotic  declaration  of  policy,  the 
property  of  our  own  country  alone,  we  should  have  had  a 
joint  English  and  American  declaration,  to  the  effect  that 
England  and  the  United  States,  while  desiring  no  por- 
tion of  the  territory  of  the  Spanish  colonies  for  them- 
selves, would  not  permit  any  intervention  of  other  pow- 
ers against  them  or  their  transfer  to  any  other  power.  It 
would  have  been  England's  declaration  as  much  as  our 
own. 

As  a  result  of  the  deliberations  of  Monroe's  Cabinet, 
the  President's  next  annual  message  to  Congress,  on  De- 
cember 2,  1823,  contained  two  passages  which  have  since 
become  historical,  as  containing  what  is  known  as  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  These  passages  are  as  follows: 

( i)  ' '  At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, made  through  the  Minister  of  the  Emperor  residing 
here,  a  full  power  and  instructions  have  been  transmitted 
to  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  St.  Petersburg,  to 
arrange,  by  amicable  negotiation,  the  respective  rights 
and  interests  of  the  two  nations  on  the  northwest  coast 
of  this  continent.  A  similar  proposal  had  been  made  by 
his  Imperial  Majesty  to  the  Government  of  Great  Britain, 
which  has  likewise  been  acceded  to.  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  been  desirous,  by  this  friendly 
proceeding,  of  manifesting  the  great  value  which  they 
have  invariably  attached  to  the  friendship  of  the  Em- 
peror, and  their  solicitude  to  cultivate  the  best  under- 
standing with  his  Government.  In  the  discussions  to 
which  this  interest  has  given  rise,  and  in  the  arrange- 
ments by  which  they  may  terminate,  the  occasion 
has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle  in 
which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and 
independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and 
maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  sub- 
jects for  future  colonization  by  any  European  power. " 


—  20  — 

(2)  "It  was  stated  at  the  commencement  of  the  last 
session  that  a  great  effort  was  then  making  in  Spain  and 
Portugal  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  people  of  those 
countries,  and  that  it  appeared  to  be  conducted  with 
extraordinary  moderation.  It  need  scarcely  be  remarked 
that  the  result  has  been  so  far  very  different  from  what 
was  then  anticipated.  Of  events  in  that  quarter  of  the 
globe  with  which  we  have  so  much  intercourse,  and 
from  which  we  derive  our  origin,  we  have  always  been 
anxious  and  interested  spectators.  The  citizens  of  the 
United  States  cherish  sentiments  the  most  friendly  in 
favor  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  their  fellow-men 
on  that  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  wars  of  the  European 
powers,  in  matters  relating  to  themselves,  we  have 
never  taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our 
policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  invaded 
or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent  injuries  or  make 
preparation  for  our  defense.  With  the  movements  in 
this  hemisphere  we  are,  of  necessity,  more  immediately 
connected,  and  by  causes  which  must  be  obvious  to 
all  enlightened  and  impartial  observers.  The  political 
system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this 
respect  from  that  of  America.  This  difference  proceeds 
from  that  which  exists  in  their  respective  governments. 
And  to  the  defense  of  our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by 
the  loss  of  so  much  blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by 
the  wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under 
which  we  have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity,  this  whole 
nation  is  devoted.  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor,  and 
to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United 
States  and  those  poiuers,  to  declare  that  we  should  con- 
sider any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safetv.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  depend- 
encies of  any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered, 
and  shall  not  interfere;  but  with  the  governments  who 
have  declared  their  independence  and.  maintained  it,  and 
whose  independence  we  have  on  great  consideration 
and  on  just  principles  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view 
any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or 
controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 
European  power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifes- 


—  21  — 

tation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United 
States.  In  the  war  between  those  new  goverments  and 
Spain  we  declared  our  neutrality  at  the  time  of  their 
recognition,  and  to  this  we  have  adhered,  and  sha/l  con- 
tinue to  adhere;  provided  no  change  shall  occur  which, 
in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of  this 
Government,  shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  indispensable  to  their  security. 
"  The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show  that 
Europe  is  still  unsettled.  Of  this  important  fact  no 
stronger  proof  can  be  adduced  than  that  the  allied  powers 
should  have  thought  it  proper,  on  a  principle  satisfactory 
to  themselves,  to  have  interposed  by  force  in  the  internal 
concerns  of  Spain.  To  what  extent  such  interposition 
may  be  carried,  on  the  same  principle,  is  a  question  to 
which  all  independent  powers  whose  governments  differ 
from  theirs  are  interested,  even  those  most  remote;  and 
surely  none  more  so  than  the  United  States.  Our  policy 
in  regard  to  Europe,  which  was  adopted  at  an  early 
stage  of  the  wars  which  have  so  long  agitated  that  quarter 
of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remains  the  same,  which  is, 
not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its 
powers;  to  consider  the  government  de facto  as  the  legi- 
timate government  for  us;  to  cultivate  friendly  relations 
with  it,  and  to  preserve  those  relations  by  a  frank, 
firm,  and  manly  policy;  meeting,  in  all  instances,  the  just 
claims  of  every  power,  submitting  to  injuries  from  none. 
But  in  regard  to  these  continents  circumstances  are 
eminently  and  conspicuously  different.  It  is  impossible 
that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political 
system  to  any  portion  of  either  continent  without  endan- 
gering our  peace  and  happiness;  nor  can  any  one  believe 
that  our  Southern  brethren,  if  left  to  themselves,  would 
adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is  equally  impossible, 
therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  interposition,  in 
any  form,  with  indifference.  If  we  look  to  the  compara- 
tive strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  those  new 
governments,  and  their  distance  from  each  other,  it  must 
be  obvious  that  she  can  never  subdue  them.  It  is  still 
the  true  policy  of  the  United  States  to  leave  the  parties 
to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that  other  powers  will 
pursue  the  same  course." 


While  the  relation  between  these  two  passages  of  the 
President's  message  is  intimate,  in  that  both  look  to  the 
exclusion  of  European  influence  from  our  hemisphere, 
yet  they  occur  in  widely  separated  parts  in  the  Presi- 
dent's message,  and,  in  reality,  treat  of  two  conditions 
of  things  differing  widely  in  their  origin.  The  first  pas- 
sage declares  against  future  European  colonization  on 
these  continents.  The  second  declares  against  the 
extension  of  the  political  system  of  the  Holy  Alliance  to 
this  hemisphere,  and  against  the  intervention  of  any 
European  power  in  the  affairs  of  the  Spanish-American 
states,  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them  or  in  any 
other  manner  controlling  their  destiny. 

The  first  passage  is  frequently  misunderstood.  Some 
have  even  gone  so  far  as  to  claim  that  it  means  there 
must  be  no  more  European  colonies  planted  on  these 
continents;  whereas,  in  fact,  it  treats  of  a  condition  of 
things  that  has  ceased  to  exist;  and  it  is  not  the  part  of 
the  message  that  can  be  invoked  in  our  day  as  an  active 
principle,  without  giving  it  a  meaning  not  intended  by 
the  message. 

The  striking  similarity  of  language  between  the  first 
passage  of  the  message  relating  to  colonization  and  the 
letter  of  Adams  to  Rush,  quoted  above,  leaves  little 
doubt  that  this  passage  originated  with  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

The  declaration  in  this  passage  had  its  origin  in  our 
dispute  with  Russia  concerning  the  Northwest  Boundary, 
Russia  claiming  as  far  south  as  fifty-one  degrees  north 
latitude,  while  England  and  our  Government  claimed  a 
large  part  of  the  same  territory. 

It  will  be  seen  from  Mr.  Adams'  letter  to  Rush,  and 
from  this  passage  in  the  President's  message,  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  Secretary,  and  of  the  President,  to 


—  23  — 

declare  merely  a  principle  of  the  public  law  of  nations, 
which  they  held  to  be  then  applicable  to  the  condition  of 
these  continents.  The  message  did  not  seek  to  claim 
that,  if  any  part  of  the  territory  of  these  continents  were 
then  in  a  wild  state  of  nature,  unclaimed  by  any  civilized 
nation,  such  territory  would  still,  nevertheless,  be  closed 
to  European  colonization.  What  both  the  President  and 
Mr.  Adams  claimed  was,  that  all  of  the  territory  of  both 
of  these  continents  was  then  "occupied  by  civilized 
nations," — meaning  that  every  part  of  the  surface  of 
both  continents  had  an  owner  whose  rights  were  recog- 
nized by  the  law  of  nations.  Therefore,  there  was  no 
room  for  future  claims  founded  on  discovery  and  colo- 
nization —  methods  of  acquiring  territory,  in  wild, 
unclaimed  countries,  recognized  by  the  law  of  nations. 
It  was  the  custom  of  those  times,  also,  that  colonial 
trade  was  completely  monopolized  by  the  mother  coun- 
try. Thus  it  will  be  noticed  that  Mr.  Adams,  in  his 
letter  to  Rush,  explains  this  position,  when  he  says  that, 
by  reason  of  the  fact  that  these  Spanish-American  colo- 
nies have  become  independent  states,  hereafter  "their 
territories  will,  of  course,  be  subject  to  no  exclusive 
right  of  navigation  in  their  vicinity,  or  of  access  by  any 
foreign  nation." 

When  Mr.  Adams  was  himself  President,  he  con- 
firmed this  view,  in  his  message  to  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  March  26,  1826,  in  which,  referring  to  the 
non-colonization  portion  of  Monroe's  message,  he  said : 

"The  principle  had  first  been  assumed  in  the  nego- 
tiation with  Russia.  It  rested  upon  a  course  of  reason- 
ing equally  simple  and  conclusive.  With  the  exception 
of  the  existing  European  colonies,  which  it  was  in  no 
wise  intended  to  disturb,  the  two  continents  consisted 
of  several  sovereign  and  independent  nations,  whose 
territories  covered  their  whole  surface.  By  this  their 


—  24  — 

independent  condition,  the  United  States  enjoyed  the 
right  of  commercial  intercourse  with  every  part  of  their 
possessions.  To  attempt  establishment  of  a  colony  in 
those  possessions  would  be  to  usurp,  to  the  exclusion  of 
others,  a  commercial  intercourse  which  was  common 
to  all." 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  if  Mr.  Adams'  position,  that 
the  whole  of  the  two  continents  was  occupied  by  inde- 
pendent and  civilized  nations,  were  conceded  to  be  cor- 
rect as  a  fact,  then  the  conclusion  must  follow  that  they 
would  not  be  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  other 
powers  than  the  owners;  for  any  attempt  by  one  power 
to  colonize  the  territory  of  another  would  be  an  act  of 
war.  So  the  correctness  of  the  principle  stated  in  this 
first  paragraph  of  the  message  depended  on  a  geograph- 
ical question  of  fact :  Was  it  true  that  the  whole  of  the 
continents  was  occupied  ? 

England  denied  the  correctness  of  the  position  as- 
sumed as  to  colonization.  It  must  be  conceded  that  there 
is  an  apparent  inconsistency  and  a  very  loose  statement, 
if  not  mistake,  of  facts  in  this  part  of  the  message.  This 
is  noticeable  on  a  comparison  of  this  passage  with  the 
second  passage  of  the  message.  In  the  first  part,  the 
President  speaks  of  "the  American  continents,  by  the 
free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  as- 
sumed and  maintain."  But  at  that  time  the  northern 
half  of  North  America  had  not  assumed  a  "free  and 
independent  condition."  On  the  contrary,  it  was  under 
Russian  and  British  dominion — a  fact  plainly  recognized 
in  the  second  passage,  where  the  President  says  :  "  With 
the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European 
power  we  have  not  interfered,  and  shall  not  interfere." 

But  whether  or  not  the  assumption  of  President  Mon- 
roe or  Mr.  Adams  was  correct,  at  that  time,  the  declara- 
tion contained  in  this  part  of  the  message  has  now  ceased 


—  25  — 

to  be  of  much  practical  importance,  unless  it  is  given  the 
new  meaning  of  "no  more  European  colonies,"  which, 
however,  was  not  the  original  intention.  For,  by  reason 
of  treaties,  and  long  possession,  the  boundaries  of  the 
nations  claiming  both  continents  are  now  universally 
recognized  to  include  the  whole  surface ;  and  they  have 
been  so  determined  and  adjusted  that  there  is  no  further 
room  for  acquisition  of  territory  by  right  of  discovery 
and  colonization. 

Historically,  it  is  the  second  passage  of  the  message 
which  contains  the  basis  of  the  present  active  principle 
involved  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Its  utterance  was 
received  with  scarcely  more  enthusiasm  in  this  country 
than  in  England.  Brougham  said  : 

"  The  question  in  regard  to  Spanish  America  is  now 
I  believe,  disposed  of,  or  nearly  so ;  for  an  event  has  re- 
cently happened  than  which  none  has  ever  dispensed 
greater  joy,  exultation,  and  gratitude  over  all  the  freemen 
of  Europe ;  that  event  which  is  decisive  on  the  subject 
is  the  language  held  with  respect  to  Spanish  America  in 
the  message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States." 

And  Sir  James  Mackintosh  said: 

"This  evidence  of  the  two  great  English  common- 
wealths (for  so  I  delight  to  call  them,  and  I  heartily  pray 
that  they  may  be  forever  united  in  the  cause  of  justice 
and  liberty)  cannot  be  contemplated  without  the  greatest 
pleasure  by  every  enlightened  citizen  of  the  earth." 

England's  position  toward  the  Holy  Alliance,  backed 
by  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe,  not  only  de- 
terred the  Alliance  from  its  contemplated  enterprise  in 
America,  but,  as  Mr.  Calhoun  said,  gave  it  a  blow  from 
which  it  never  recovered.  Its  influence  began  to  decline, 
and  it  finally  perished  in  the  European  revolutions  of  the 
middle  of  this  century. 

But  as  an  evidence  of  the  conservatism  that  has  from 


—  26  — 

the  beginning  pervaded  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  while  the  sentiments  per- 
vading the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  a  part  of  the  historic 
growth  of  our  people;  while  the  doctrine,  when  it  was 
uttered,  met  with  a  hearty,  popular  welcome;  while  it  has 
ever  been  cherished  by  our  people,  and  seems  almost  to 
be  a  passion  with  them, — yet  it  has  never  received  the 
sanction  of  Congress,  and  it  remains  to  this  day,  so  far  as 
official  sanction  goes,  only  a  declaration  of  the  adminis- 
tration which  uttered  it  and  of  subsequent  administrations 
which  have  approved  or  amplified  it. 

The  declaration  of  Monroe  itself  accomplished  its  im- 
mediate purpose.  The  designs  of  the  Alliance  on  this 
hemisphere  were  abandoned.  When  the  danger  was 
past,  our  statesmen  hesitated  about  affirming  the  doctrine 
as  a  part  of  our  national  policy.  Some  acted  from  tim- 
idity, some  from  conservatism  and  a  belief  that  its  asser- 
tion would  lead  us  into  difficulties  and  disputes  that  were 
none  of  our  affairs,  and  that  it  was  contrary  to  our  tradi- 
tional policy,  so  earnestly  recommended  by  Washington, 
of  not  entangling  ourselves  in  the  affairs  of  Europe.  In 
the  very  Congress  to  which  President  Monroe's  message 
was  addressed,  Henry  Clay  introduced  the  following 
resolution  in  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  the  State  of  the 
Union: 

"Resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  of  America,  in  Congress 
assembled:  That  the  people  of  these  States  would  not 
see,  without  serious  inquietude,  any  forcible  intervention 
by  the  allied  powers  of  Europe,  in  behalf  of  Spain,  to  re- 
duce to  their  former  subjection  those  parts  of  the  conti- 
nent of  America  which  have  proclaimed  and  established 
for  themselves,  respectively,  independent  governments, 
and  which  have  been  solemnly  recognized  by  the  United 
States." 


—  27  — 

A  similar  resolution  was  also  introduced  by  Mr.  Poin-» 
sett,  of  South  Carolina,  but  neither  resolution  was  ever 
called  up  for  action. 

As  to  the  meaning  of  this  second  passage  of  the  mes- 
sage, there  has  probably  been  as  much  misunderstanding 
as  in  case  of  the  first. 

In  Mr.  Canning's  proposal  to  Mr.  Rush,  he  asked  that 
the  joint  declaration  to  be  made  by  both  countries  should 
declare  not  only  against  intervention  by  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance, but  also  that  the  two  Governments  themselves  did 
not  aim  at  the  possession  of  any  of  the  Spanish  colonies, 
and  that  they  could  not  with  indifference  see  any  portion 
of  them" transferred  to  any  other  power. 

We  have  seen  also  that  in  Jefferson's  letter  to  Monroe 
he  advised  a  joint  declaration,  stating  — 

"that  we  aim  not  at  the  acquisition  of  any  of  those 
possessions;  that  we  will  not  stand  in  the  way  of  any 
amicable  arrangement  between  them  [the  colonies]  and 
the  mother  country;  but  that  we  will  oppose  with  all  our 
means  the  forcible  interposition  of  any  other  power  as 
auxiliary,  stipendiary,  or  under  any  other  form  or  pretext, 
and  most  especially  their  transfer  to  any  power  by  con- 
quest, cession,  or  acquisition  in  any  other  way." 

Monroe's  message,  however,  is  confined  to  making 
the  following  declarations : 

First.  Against  "  any  attempt  on  their  part  [that  is, 
the  Holy  Alliance]  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion 
of  this  hemisphere."  Literally,  this  meant  the  system 
of  the  Holy  Alliance.  It  is  scarcely  probable  that  it  was 
intended  to  convey  any  idea  of  hostility  to  monarchical 
institutions  as  such,  because  during  this  very  Monroe 
administration,  we  were  among  the  first  to  recognize  the 
Emperor  Iturbide  in  Mexico  and  the  Emperor  Dom 
Pedro  in  Brazil. 


—  28  — 

Second.  It  declared  against  "any  interposition  for 
the  purpose  of  oppressing  them  [the  Spanish-American 
States]  or  controlling  in  any  manner  their  destiny,  by 
any  European  power." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  message  does  not  follow 
either  Canning  or  Jefferson,  in  declaring  against  new 
acquisitions  of  territory  by  European  powers;  and  there 
is  nothing  in  the  message  that  would  preclude  a  Euro- 
pean power  from  acquiring  the  territory  of  an  independent 
American  state,  provided  it  were  done  by  voluntary  treaty, 
and  provided  there  were  no  oppression  or  coercion,  or  no 
interposition  by  third  powers.  Furthermore,  there  is 
nothing  in  the  message  that  would  preclude  a  European 
nation  from  making  war  upon  an  American  state,  if  such 
war  were  made  for  a  just  cause  and  not  for  purposes  of 
a  political  or  ambitious  nature;  and  there  is  nothing  that 
would  prevent  the  European  state  acquiring  the  territory 
of  the  American  state  as  the  result  of  such  a  war.  For 
the  right  to  wage  war  almost  necessarily  involves  the 
latter  proposition.  On  this  point,  Mr.  Richard  Henry 
Dana,  Jr.,  has  said  : 

"  Confining  itself  to  a  declaration  against  interposition 
to  oppress  or  control,  or  to  extend  the  system  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  to  this  hemisphere,  the  message  avoids 
committing  the  Government  on  the  subject  of  acquisi- 
tion, either  by  the  United  States  or  the  European 
powers,  and  whether  by  cession  or  conquest.  Possibly 
the  administration  may  have  paused  at  Mr.  Jefferson's 
caution  in  his  letter  referred  to  :  *  But  we  must  first  ask 
ourselves  a  question  —  Do  we  wish  to  acquire  any  one  or 
more  of  the  Spanish  provinces?  —  before  we  can  unite 
in  the  proposed  declaration.'  " 

And  Mr.  Dana  further  says  : 

"When  we  compare  the  declarations  in  the  message 
with  the  joint  declaration  proposed  by  Mr.  Canning  and 


—  29  — 

recommended  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  and  consider  our  own 
prior  history  and  our  then  position,  it  certainly  is  affair 
inference  that  the  administration  purposely  avoided  any 
specific  and  direct  statement  as  to  transfer  of  dominion 
by  competent  parties  in  the  way  of  treaty  or  by  conquest 
in  war." 

Evidently  the  doctrine,  as  declared  by  Monroe,  recog- 
nizes the  complete  independence  of  the  different  Ameri- 
can States  ;  and,  of  course,  this  would  include  their 
right,  of  their  own  volition,  to  do  with  their  own  terri- 
tory or  their  own  form  of  government,  as  they  pleased, 
even  to  ceding  their  territory  to  a  European  power. 

But  at  this  day  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not  confined 
within  the  letter  of  the  Monroe  declaration.  It  is  very 
questionable  if  the  United  States  would  permit  any 
European  nation  to  acquire  more  territory,  from  any 
independent  nation  on  these  Continents,  than  such 
European  nation  is  at  present  entitled  to,  even  by 
voluntary  cession.  And  it  is  almost  inconceivable  that 
the  United  States  would  permit  such  close  neighbors  as 
the  British  provinces  on  the  north,  or  even  Cuba,  to  fall 
into  other  European  hands  than  their  present  owners.  It 
is  quite  as  certain  also  that  the  United  States  would  not  at 
this  day  permit  any  such  acquisition  of  territory  by  a 
European  power,  as  the  result  of  a  lawful  or  just  war. 

As  early  as  1845,  President  Polk,  in  dealing  with  the 
Northwestern  Boundary  question,  sought  to  give  to  the 
colonization  declaration  of  the  Monroe  message  the 
meaning  of  "no  more  European  colonies."  But  he 
confined  his  declaration  to  North  America.  He  said  : 

"  It  should  be  distinctly  announced  as  our  settled 
policy  that  no  future  European  colony  or  dominion  shall, 
with  our  consent,  be  planted  or  established  on  any  part 
of  the  North  American  Continent." 

And  in  1848,  when  different  parties  of  the  white  people 


—  30  — 

of  Yucatan  offered  the  sovereignty  of  that  country  to 
the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Spain,  respect- 
ively, President  Polk,  in  a  message  to  Congress,  de- 
clared that: 

"We  could  not  consent  to  a  transfer  of  this  dominion 
and  sovereignty  to  Spain,  Great  Britain,  or  any  other 
power." 

There  are  two  notable  instances  in  our  career,  in  one 
of  which  we  seem  to  have  repudiated  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, and  in  the  other  of  which  we  seem  to  have  aban- 
doned it. 

The  first  is  the  case  of  the  Panama  Congress. 

In  1825,  the  Spanish-American  countries  called  a  con- 
gress at  Panama  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  and  adopt- 
ing measures  affecting  the  welfare  and  development  of 
the  American  continents,  and  of  forming  some  sort  of  an 
alliance,  based  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  applicable  to 
this  hemisphere.  President  Adams  accepted  the  invita- 
tion to  join  the  Congress  and  appointed  envoys  whose 
names  he  sent  to  the  Senate.  After  a  bitter  debate  in 
both  houses,  the  Senate  finally  concurred  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  envoys;  but  they  were  only  to  take  part  in  a 
diplomatic  way.  In  the  House  of  Representatives  when 
the  question  of  making  an  appropriation  for  the  expenses 
of  the  envoys  came  up,  the  House  adopted  a  resolution 
stating  that  the  United  States  ought  not 

"to  form  any  alliance  offensive  or  defensive,  or  nego- 
tiate respecting  such  alliance  with  all  or  any  of  the  South 
American  republics;  nor  ought  they  to  become  parties 
with  them,  or  either  of  them,  to  any  joint  declaration 
for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  interference  of  any  of 
the  European  powers  with  their  independence  or  form 
of  government,  or  to  any  compact  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting colonization  upon  the  continents  of  America;  but 
that  the  people  of  the  United  States  should  be  left  free  to 


act,  in  any  crisis,  in  such  manner  as  their  feelings  of 
friendship  towards  these  republics,  and  as  their  own 
honor  and  policy,  may  at  any  time  dictate." 

Before  our  envoys  reached  Panama  the  Congress  had 
adjourned. 

The  other  instance — the  one  where  our  Government 
seems  to  have  abandoned  the  Monroe  Doctrine — was  the 
entering  into  the  treaty  with  England  known  as  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  in  1850. 

This  treaty  provides  that  neither  Government  "  will 
ever  obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control 
over  "  the  ship  canal  contemplated  in  the  treaty;  that 
when  completed,  they  "guarantee  the  protection  and 
neutrality  of  the  canal  ";  and  both  governments  "  agree 
to  extend  their  protection,  by  treaty  stipulations,  to  any 
other  practicable  communications  whether  by  canal  or 
railway  across  the  isthmus ";  and  especially  those 
"which  are  now  proposed  to  be  established  by  the  way 
of  Tehuantepec  or  Panama." 

In  the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Frelinghuysen 
and  Earl  Granville  in  1882,  upon  the  subject  of  this 
treaty, — taking  the  matter  up  where  it  was  left  off  by 
Mr.  Elaine, — Mr.  Frelinghuysen  maintained  that  a  pro- 
tectorate by  a  European  nation  would  be  in  conflict  with 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  I  will  quote  Mr.  Frelinghuysen's 
language,  as  that  of  one  who  was  considered  an  able  and 
a  safe  statesman,  and  also  because  it  is  so  recent  an 
expression  by  one  in  authority  in  relation  to  this  doc- 
trine. He  says: 

"  The  President  believes  that  the  formation  of  a  pro- 
tectorate by  European  nations  over  the  isthmus  transit 
would  be  in  conflict  with  a  doctrine  which  has  been  for 
many  years  asserted  by  the  United  States.  This  senti- 
ment is  properly  termed  a  doctrine,  as  it  has  no  pre- 
scribed sanction,  and  its  assertion  is  left  to  the  exigency 


—  32  — 

which  may  invoke  it.  It  has  been  repeatedly  announced 
by  the  Executive  Department  of  this  Government,  and 
through  the  utterances  of  distinguished  citizens;  it  is 
cherished  by  the  American  people,  and  has  been 
approved  by  the  Government  of  Great  Britain. 

4 '  It  is  not  the  inhospitable  principle  which  it  is  some- 
times charged  with  being,  and  which  asserts  that  Euro- 
pean nations  shall  not  retain  dominion  on  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  that  none  but  republican  governments  shall 
here  be  tolerated;  for  we  well  know  that  a  large  part  of 
the  North  American  continent  is  under  the  dominion  of 
her  Majesty's  Government,  and  that  the  United  States 
were  in  the  past  the  first  to  recognize  the  imperial  author- 
ity of  Dom  Pedro  in  Brazil  and  of  Iturbide  in  Mexico. 

"  It  is  not  necessary  now  to  define  that  doctrine;  but 
its  history  clearly  shows  that  it  at  least  opposes  any 
intervention  by  European  nations  in  the  political  affairs 
of  the  American  republics." 

From  the  statements  of  some  of  our  public  men  and 
newspapers,  it  is  evident  that  an  opinion  prevails,  quite 
extensively,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  makes  our  nation 
the  protector  of  all  the  independent  states  of  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  that,  while  we  cannot  control  the  conduct 
of  these  states,  we  are,  nevertheless,  bound  to  espouse 
their  quarrels,  if  one  party  thereto  is  a  European  nation. 
While  such  a  position  would  be  an  absurd  one  for  us  to 
take,  yet,  if  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  to  be  maintained  as 
at  present  understood,  we  must  be  prepared  to  find  our- 
selves, on  occasions,  in  positions  of  great  delicacy  and 
difficulty.  As  a  great,  enlightened,  and  just  nation,  we 
are  justified  in  following  a  policy  which  our  honest  judg- 
ment tells  us  is  for  our  best  interests.  But  while  we 
claim  complete  independence  for  ourselves,  are  we  not 
denying  such  complete  independence  to  our  neighbors, 
when  we  declare  that  they  cannot,  even  voluntarily,  cede 
their  own  territory  to  a  European  power,  or  that  they 
may  not  invite  the  protectorate  of  a  European  power  ? 


—  33  — 

We  certainly  should  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  dragged 
into  the  unwise  and  reckless  quarrels  which  those  too 
often  very  unwisely  governed  states  may  bring  upon 
themselves.  For  such  an  attitude  on  our  part,  would  only 
encourage  the  insolence  of  some  of  those  states  toward 
European  nations;  and  that  is  a  quality,  in  some  of  them, 
which  does  not  need  to  be  encouraged.  But,  if  we 
assume  to  so  far  deny  the  independent  sovereignty  of 
those  states  as  to  deny  their  right  to  cede  their  territory,  or 
to  invite  a  European  protectorate,  we  certainly  must  have 
some  corresponding  duty  toward  them.  We  should 
doubtless  see  to  it  that  they  are  not  oppressed  or  im- 
posed upon  in  their  dealings  with  European  states  ;  but 
we  must  at  the  same  time  admit  that  our  position  in  this 
respect  is  one  which  will  be  maintained,  not  for  their 
sakes,  but  for  our  own,  and  with  a  view,  regardless  of 
their  theoretical  rights,  to  prevent  and  forestall  possible 
dangers  to  our  own  safety  and  welfare. 

It  must  be  evident  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  frame 
a  definition  of  our  relations  with  the  Spanish-American 
states  which  will  be  satisfactory  to  them  and  to  us  also. 
In  addition  to  the  extreme  delicacy  inherent  in  the  sub- 
ject itself,  especially  from  our  assumed  interests  in  this 
whole  hemisphere,  there  is  the  further  fact  that  the  con- 
trol of  the  matters  involved  frequently  changes  hands ; 
and  the  different,  and  sometimes  divergent,  views  of 
those  in  control  of  our  affairs  change  the  character  and 
the  line  of  action  from  that  pursued  by  their  prede- 
cessors. 

For  instance,  when  Mr.  Elaine  was  in  the  State  De- 
partment, during  the  war  between  Chile  and  Peru,  in 
1881,  the  affairs  of  Peru  became  so  desperate  that  it 
seemed  as  if  she  might  be  wiped  out  of  existence. 


-34  — 

President  Gr£vy  of  France  proposed  a  joint  interven- 
tion by  France,  England,  and  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Elaine  declined  the  invitation,  giving  as  a  reason,  that 
while  our  Government  appreciated  the  motive,  yet  it 
gravely  doubted  "the  expediency  of  a  joint  interven- 
tion with  European  powers,  either  by  material  pressure 
or  by  moral  or  political  influence."  Mr.  Elaine  wrote 
Mr.  Trescott,  our  special  envoy,  that  if  our  own  good 
offices  were  refused  to  prevent  the  absorption  of  Peru 
by  Chile,  we  would  be  free  to  "  appeal  to  the  other  Re- 
publics of  this  Continent  to  join  in  an  effort  to  avert" 
such  consequences. 

A  few  months  later,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  Mr.  Elaine's 
successor  in  the  State  Department,  wrote  Mr.  Trescott 
that  the  President  was  "  convinced  that  the  United  States 
has  no  right  which  is  conferred  either  by  treaty  stipula- 
tions or  by  public  law  to  impose  on  the  belligerents,  un- 
asked, its  views  of  a  just  settlement." 

Mr.  Elaine,  afterwards,  in  discussing  this  episode,  in 
his  essay  on  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Garfield  admin- 
tration,  said: 

"  Our  own  Government  cannot  take  the  ground  that 
it  will  not  offer  friendly  intervention  to  settle  troubles 
between  American  countries,  unless  at  the  same  time  it 
freely  concedes  to  European  Governments  the  right  of 
such  intervention,  and  thus  consents  to  a  practical  de- 
struction of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  an  unlimited  in- 
crease of  European  influence  on  this  continent.  The  late 
special  envoy  to  Peru  and  Chile,  Mr.  Trescott,  gives  it 
as  his  deliberate  and  published  conclusion,  that  if  the  in- 
structions under  which  he  set  out  upon  his  mission  had 
not  been  revoked,  peace  between  those  angry  belliger- 
ents would  have  been  established  as  the  result  of  his 
labors — necessarily  to  the  great  benefit  of  the  United 
States.  If  our  Government  does  not  resume  its  efforts 
to  secure  peace  in  South  America,  some  European  Gov- 


-35- 

ernment  will  be  forced  to  perform  that  friendly  office. 
The  United  States  cannot  play  between  nations  the  part 
of  dog  in  the  manger." 

Probably  the  nearest  to  a  satisfactory  definition  of  our 
relations  with  the  Spanish-American  states  that  has  ever 
been  made,  is  that  contained  in  a  letter  from  Mr.  Seward 
to  General  Kilpatrick,  our  Minister  to  Chile,  on  June  2, 
1866,  at  the  time  of  the  Spanish  bombardment  of  Val- 
paraiso. Mr.  Seward  said: 

"We  maintain  and  insist  with  all  the  decision  and 
energy  compatible  with  our  existing  neutrality,  that  the 
republican  system  which  is  accepted  by  the  people  in 
any  one  of  those  states  shall  not  be  wantonly  assailed, 
and  that  it  shall  not  be  subverted  as  an  end  of  a  lawful 
war  by  European  powers.  We  thus  give  to  those  re- 
publics the  moral  support  of  a  sincere,  liberal,  and  we 
think  it  will  appear  a  useful,  friendship.  .  .  .  Those 
who  think  that  the  United  States  could  enter  as  an  ally 
into  every  war  in  which  a  friendly  republican  state  on 
this  continent  became  involved  forget  that  peace  is  the 
constant  interest  and  unswerving  policy  of  the  United 
States." 

This  was  the  position  which  our  Government  took  with 
regard  to  Mexico  in  dealing  with  the  French  invasion  of 
that  country. 

One  of  the  brightest  incidents  in  our  national  history 
is  the  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  case  of 
this  French  invasion. 

Spain,  England,  and  France  had  heavy  claims  for  debts 
and  damages  against  Mexico,  and  they  formed  a  conven- 
tion, by  which  they  agreed,  if  Mexico  refused  to  settle 
their  claims,  they  would  take  possession  of  Mexican 
ports  and  sequestrate  the  customs  toward  such  payment. 
That  such  a  step  was  within  the  rights  of  their  powers, 
and  not  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  is  plainly; 
stated  by  Secretary  Seward,  who  said: 


"The  President  does  not  question  that  the  sovereigns 
represented  have  undoubted  right  to  decide  for  them- 
selves the  fact  whether  they  have  sustained  grievances, 
and  to  resort  to  war  against  Mexico  for  the  redress  there- 
of, and  have  a  right  also  to  levy  the  war  severally  or 
jointly. " 

But  he  asserted  the  Monroe  Doctrine  when  he  said 
further  that  the  United  States  was  happy  to  be  informed 
and  believe  that — 

"  Neither  one  nor  all  of  the  contracting  parties  shall, 
as  a  result  or  consequence  of  the  hostilities  to  be  inaugu- 
rated under  the  convention,  exercise  in  the  subsequent 
affairs  of  Mexico  any  influence  of  a  character  to  impair 
the  right  of  the  Mexican  people  to  choose  and  freely  to 
constitute  the  form  of  its  own  government." 

The  troops  of  the  allies  had  scarcely  landed  at  Vera 
Cruz  when  the  sinister  designs  of  Napoleon  became 
manifest,  and  Spain  and  England  promptly  withdrew 
from  the  enterprise.  While  our  hands  were  full  with 
our  Civil  War,  Napoleon  made  Maximilian  of  Austria 
Emperor  of  Mexico,  and  maintained  him  in  his  position 
by  French  bayonets.  Our  Government  hearing  that 
Austria  was  also  to  send  troops  to  support  Maximilian, 
notified  the  Austrian  Government  that  if  it  sent  any 
troops  for  such  a  purpose,  we  would  no  longer  "  remain 
as  silent  and  neutral  spectators." 

Finally,  as  American  troops,  under  Sheridan,  were 
being  sent  in  large  numbers  to  our  Southwestern  frontier, 
Napoleon  deemed  it  wise  to  withdraw  his  French  troops, 
and  Mexico  soon  regained  her  independence. 

This  case,  by  reason  of  the  ultimate  political  designs 
of  the  French  Emperor,  involved  a  genuine  application 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  Mexican  case  and  the  statements  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  made  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  relating 


—  37  — 

to  it  show  that  it  is  not  a  violation  of  that  doctrine  for  a 
European  state  to  make  war  upon  an  American  state,  if 
not  made  for  political  or  ambitious  purposes,  or  even  to 
take  possession  of  the  ports  or  custom-houses  of  the 
American  state  in  order  to  enforce  the  collection  of 
indemnities  or  debts. 

Of  course,  if  claims  of  this  kind  were  simply  subter- 
fuges to  cover  designs  for  acquiring  territory,  or  over- 
throwing the  chosen  form  of  government  of  the  people 
of  such  state,  the  case  would  be  different. 

Therefore,  when  the  British  recently  took  possession 
of  the  port  of  Corinto,  in  Nicaragua,  there  was  no 
violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  although  such  was 
loudly  and  widely  asserted  to  be  the  case  in  some 
quarters.  The  cause  of  England's  grievance  against 
Nicaragua  was  an  insult  to  the  dignity  of  the  British 
nation,  represented  in  the  person  of  one  of  her  consular 
agents.  England  claimed  that  some  of  her  private  citi- 
zens had  also  been  maltreated.  But  their  claims  she 
was  willing  to  leave  to  a  tribunal  of  arbitration.  For  the 
insults  to  the  consul,  however,  she  demanded  seventy- 
five  thousand  dollars  smart  money.  While  this  is  a  large 
sum  of  money,  it  could  not  be  said  that  its  payment 
would  involve  or  endanger  the  independence  of  Nica- 
ragua. For  a  much  less  offense  than  that  given  to 
England  in  this  matter — in  fact,  for  injury  to  the  property 
of  private  American  citizens, — our  Government,  in  1854, 
demanded  an  indemnity  of  twenty-four  thousand  dollars 
from  the  town  of  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  and  when  it 
was  not  promptly  paid,  an  American  man-of-war  bom- 
barded the  town,  and  afterwards,  "in  order  to  inculcate 
a  lesson  never  to  be  forgotten,"  burned  such  of  the 
buildings  as  were  left  standing. 

Another  conspicuous  example,  showing  that  the  occu- 


pation  of  a  city  or  port  of  an  American  state  for  the  col- 
lection of  a  just  claim  is  not  a  violation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  is  found  in  the  correspondence  between  Mr. 
Elaine  and  the  Governments  of  France  and  Venezuela 
on  the  subject  of  the  claims  of  France  against  Venezuela. 
This  correspondence  is  published  in  the  document  on 
foreign  relations  for  i88r.  A  number  of  European  Gov- 
ernments, and  also  our  own  Government,  had  claims 
against  Venezuela.  France  had  succeeded,  however,  in 
anticipating  the  other  Governments  in  having  her  claims 
recognized  by  Venezuela,  by  treaty.  But  Venezuela  was 
not  living  up  to  the  terms  of  payment.  France  contem- 
plated taking  possession  of  Venezuelan  ports  to  collect 
her  claim.  Mr.  Elaine  interceded  for  Venezuela. 

In  this  correspondence  Mr.  Elaine  refers  to  the  ru- 
mored design  of  France  to  take  "  forcible  possession  of 
some  of  the  harbors  and  a  portion  of  the  territory  of 
Venezuela  in  compensation  for  debts  due  to  citizens  of 
the  French  Republic." 

This  last  phrase  may  be  an  unfortunate  use  of  words. 
The  taking  of  Venezuelan  territory  "  in  compensation  for 
debts"  would  certainly  be  a  violation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  declared  by  Polk  and  Seward. 

To  the  pathetic  appeals  of  Mr.  Comacho,  the  Vene- 
zuelan Minister,  Mr.  Elaine  replied  that  he  did  not  believe 
France  contemplated  such  an  extreme  step.  The  Vene- 
zuelan Minister  calls  Mr.  Elaine's  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  people  of  Venezuela  are  in  great  anxiety  and  distress 
over  the  matter,  and  that  they  do  not  believe  that  the 
French  impatience  with  them  is  on  account  of  the  small 
dispute  about  payments,  as  the  expense  France  must  go  to 
in  the  armed  enforcement  of  her  claims  would  be  far  greater 
than  the  amount  involved.  He  also  calls  Mr.  Elaine's  at- 
tention to  the  ambitious  colonial  designs  of  France  in  Mad- 


-39  — 

agascar  and  other  quarters  of  the  globe,  and  asserts  his 
belief  that  France  has  designs  on  Venezuelan  territory. 
Our  Minister  in  Paris  had  like  fears.  Mr.  Elaine  does 
not  once  in  this  correspondence,  either  with  the  Vene- 
zuelan or  our  own  representatives,  refer  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine ;  but  in  his  letters  to  Minister  Noyes  he  claims, 
and  he  instructs  that  Minister  to  so  represent  to  the 
French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that  such  a  course 
as  that  which  it  was  reported  France  intended  to  take 
would  be  unjust  to  the  other  creditors  of  Venezuela, 
including  the  United  States.  He  protested  that,  if  Vene- 
zuela was  to  be  treated  as  an  independent  nation,  all  of 
her  creditors  must  stand  on  the  same  footing,  and  France 
had  no  right  to  priority;  if  Venezuela  was  to  be  regarded 
as  a  bankrupt,  still  all  of  her  creditors  should  stand  on 
the  same  footing ;  and  that  if  France  should  take  the 
steps  reported  to  be  contemplated,  the  other  nations 
would  be  deprived  of  a  part  of  their  security.  Finally, 
Mr.  Elaine  suggests,  ''without  attempting  to  prescribe 
or  dictate,"  that  the  United  States  place  an  agent  at 
Caracas,  authorized  to  receive  monthly  payments  from 
Venezuela,  and  to  distribute  the  same  pro  rata  among 
the  creditor  nations;  and,  in  the  event  of  default  for  a 
certain  time,  that  this  agent  should  take  possession  of 
the  custom-houses  of  the  two  principal  ports  of  Vene- 
zuela and  collect  the  customs.  To  France  he  expresses 
the  "solicitude"  of  our  Government  "for  the  higher 
object  of  averting  hostilities  between  two  republics,  for 
each  of  which  it  feels  the  most  sincere  and  enduring 
friendship." 

That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  require  us  to  as- 
sume the  guardianship  of  our  Southern  neighbors  is 
further  shown  by  the  following  occurrences  in  which  ouf 
Government  did  not  feel  called  upon  to  interfere. 


—  40  — 

In  1842,  and  again  in  1844,  England  blockaded  the 
port  of  San  Juan  de  Nicaragua.  In  1851,  England  laid 
an  embargo  on  the  traffic  of  the  port  of  La  Union,  in 
Salvador,  and  blockaded  the  whole  coast  of  that  state. 

In  1862  and  1863,  England  seized  a  number  of  Brazil- 
ian vessels  in  Brazilian  waters,  by  way  of  reprisal  for 
the  plundering  of  an  English  ship  off  the  coast  of  Brazil. 

In  1838,  France  blockaded  the  ports  of  Mexico,  in 
redress  for  unsatisfied  demands.  In  1845,  France  and 
England  blockaded  the  ports  and  coast  of  Buenos  Ayres, 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  independence  of  Uru- 
guay. 

In  1866,  Chile  invoked  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  sought 
our  aid  in  her  war  against  Spain,  which  latter  power  was 
at  the  time  bombarding  Valparaiso.  Mr.  Seward,  as  we 
have  seen,  wrote  to  General  Kilpatrick,  our  Minister, 
defining  the  position  of  our  Government,  and  stated  in 
effect  that  the  United  States  was  not  bound  to  take  part 
in  the  wars  in  which  a  South  American  republic  may  en- 
ter with  a  European  sovereign,  when  the  object  of  the 
latter  is  not  political  or  ambitious  in  its  nature  or  for  the 
establishment  of  a  monarchy  under  a  European  prince, 
in  place  of  a  subverted  republic,  as  in  the  case  of  Mexico. 

Probably  as  extreme  a  case  of  the  assertion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  has  ever  occurred  in  our  history  is 
that  just  made  by  President  Cleveland  in  the  Venezuela 
boundary  controversy.  But  under  the  facts  of  the  case, 
as  generally  understood,  it  would  seem,  if  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  to  be  considered  a  vital  principle  of  our  pol- 
icy, that  the  position  taken  by  the  President  is  right  and 
just,  and  should  be  maintained.  Regardless  of  whether 
England  is  in  the  right  or  Venezuela  is  in  the  right,  the 
fact  remains  that  there  is  a  dispute  of  over  half  a  cen- 
tury's duration,  as  to  the  proper  boundary  between  the 
territories  of  British  Guiana  and  Venezuela. 


—  41  — 

The  territory  involved  is  a  large  one — an  empire  in 
extent.  The  portion  lying  east  of  what  is  known  as  the 
Schomburgk  line  is  said  to  be  about  forty  thousand 
square  miles.  But  the  British  claim  has  varied  at  differ- 
ent times,  so  that  the  extreme  British  claim  is  more  than 
twice  that  area.  If  a  war  should  occur  between  Vene- 
zuela and  England,  it  is  certain  that  Venezuela,  whether 
right  or  wrong,  must  go  to  the  wall.  If  it  should  be  that 
Venezuela  is  in  the  right,  and  it  should  come  to  pass, 
as  the  result  of  such  a  war,  that  she  would  lose  this  ter- 
ritory, then  undoubtedly  Venezuela  would  be  oppressed 
and  despoiled  of  her  territory;  and  her  territory  would 
pass  to  a  European  power  as  the  result  of  such  oppres- 
sion and  spoliation.  It  is  almost  universal  among  civi- 
lized nations  to  refer  disputes  as  to  boundaries  which 
cannot  be  ascertained  accurately  to  friendly  arbitration. 
England  and  the  United  States  have  frequently  resorted 
to  such  methods,  and  will  doubtless  do  so  again.  The 
position  of  England,  therefore,  in  the  Venezuela  matter 
seems  harsh,  unjust,  and  oppressive,  and  would  seem  to 
indicate  a  feeling  of  weakness  in  the  justice  of  her  case. 
Our  Government  has  asked  England  to  consent  to  a 
friendly  arbitration.  England  has  hitherto  refused  to 
comply  with  this  reasonable  and  just  request,  except  as 
to  a  portion  of  the  territory  in  dispute.  This  condition 
of  affairs  has  called  forth  a  declaration  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  which,  while  it  does  not  go  as  far  as  the  decla- 
rations of  President  Polk,  has  a  wider  scope,  in  that  it 
includes  the  South  American  continent^  The  President 
declares: 

4 'That  the  traditional  and  established  policy  of  this 
Government  is  firmly  opposed  to  a  forcible  increase  by 
any  European  power  of  its  territorial  possessions  in  this 
continent ;  that  this  policy  is  as  well  founded  in  principle 
as  it  is  strongly  supported  by  numerous  precedents  ; 


—  42  — 

that,  as  a  consequence,  the  United  States  is  bound  to 
protest  against  the  enlargement  of  area  of  British  Guiana 
in  derogation  of  the  rights  and  against  the  will  of  Vene- 
zuela; that,  considering  the  disparity  in  strength  of 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  the  territorial  dispute 
between  them  can  be  reasonably  settled  only  by  friendly, 
impartial  arbitration,  and  the  resort  to  such  arbitration 
should  include  the  whole  controversy,  and  is  not  satisfied 
if  one  of  the  powers  concerned  is  permitted  to  draw  an 
arbitrary  line  through  the  territory  in  debate,  and  declare 
that  it  will  submit  to  arbitration  only  the  portion  lying 
on  one  side  of  it." 

This  new  declaration  seems  to  involve  a  new  and 
additional  principle,  namely,  that  in  certain  cases  of 
disputes  between  a  strong  European  power  and  a  weak 
American  state,  where  the  disparity  of  strength  is  so 
great  that  the  American  state  would  necessarily  suffer 
defeat  as  the  result  of  a  war,  regardless  of  the  justice  of 
its  cause,  the  dispute  must  be  settled  by  arbitration. 
This  will  be  especially  so,  where  the  result  of  the  contro- 
versy might  mean  the  extension  of  European  territory  on 
this  hemisphere. 

There  have  always  been  many  who  have  opposed  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  mischievous  one,  because,  they 
claim,  it  is  opposed  to  the  principle  of  non-intervention 
and  neutrality,  so  earnestly  advocated  by  Washington 
in  his  farewell  address.  But  while  it  may  have  a 
tendency  to  entangle  us  in  the  affairs  of  the  states  on 
these  American  continents,  its  maintenance  must  have 
a  tendency  to  keep  us  out  of  the  broils  of  Europe. 
Jefferson,  who  was  passionately  for  peace  and  against 
entangling  alliances,  disposes  of  this  objection  in  his 
letter  to  Monroe,  where  he  says  : 

"  But  the  war  in  which  the  present  proposition  might 
engage  us,  should  that  be  its  consequence,  is  not  her 
[England's]  war,  but  ours.  Its  object  is  to  introduce  and 


—  43  — 

establish  the  American  system  of  keeping  out  of  our  land 
all  foreign  powers,  of  never  permitting  those  of  Europe 
to  intermeddle  with  the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is  to 
maintain  our  principle,  not  to  depart  from  it." 

And  passionately  as  Jefferson  loved  France,  we  find 
him,  in  1802,  writing  to  Livingston,  our  Minister  to  that 
country,  with  reference  to  the  cession  of  Louisiana  by 
Spain  to  Bonaparte,  that  this  act  would  convert  France 
into  "our  natural  and  habitual  enemy."  He  says: 

"It  is  impossible  that  France  and  the  United  States 
can  continue  long  friends  when  they  meet  in  so  irritable 
a  position.  .  .  .  We  must  be  very  improvident  if  we 
do  not  begin  to  make  arrangements  on  that  hypothesis. 
The  day  that  France  takes  possession  of  New  Orleans 
fixes  the  sentence  which  is  to  restrain  her  forever  within 
her  low-water  mark.  It  seals  the  union  of  two  nations 
who,  in  conjunction,  can  maintain  exclusive  possession 
of  the  ocean.  From  that  moment  we  must  marry  our- 
selves to  the  British  fleet  and  nation." 

As  Mr.  Morse  says,  in  his  biography  of  Jefferson: 

"One  almost  discredits  his  own  senses  as  he  beholds 
Jefferson  voluntarily  proclaiming  the  banns  for  these  nup- 
tials, which  during  so  many  years  past  would  have 
seemed  to  him  worse  than  illicit." 

Still  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  Jefferson  proclaimed 
a  great  truth.  How  much  of  the  present  ill-feeling 
toward  England  in  this  country  is  created  by  her  neigh- 
borhood to  us  on  this  continent  ? 

There  can  be  scarcely  a  doubt  that  if  this  cause  of 
irritability  were  removed,  the  popular  feeling  in  this 
country  toward  England  would  become  much  more 
patient  and  friendly.  Why  all  our  anxiety  and  talk  of 
coast  and  harbor  defenses  and  more  ships  for  our  navy  ? 
What  mean  the  heavily  fortified  naval  stations  maintained  • 
by  England  at  Halifax  and  Esquimalt?  Whom  do  we 
fear,  that  we  must  make  mighty  preparations  for  our 


—  44  — 

own  defense  and  safety?  There  is  only  one  answer: 
England  and  her  dependency  on  the  north. 

The  absence  of  powerful  neighbors  has  been  an 
inestimable  blessing  to  the  United  States  in  many  ways. 
The  nation  has  thereby  been  spared  much  in  the 
possibility  of  wasteful  and  ruinous  wars,  and  in  the 
necessity  for  maintaining  powerful  standing  armies.  It 
has  been  able  to  devote  all  of  its  wealth  and  energies 
to  material  development  and  growth,  and  to  the  pursuit 
of  the  arts  of  peace.  With  the  exception  of  the  British 
dominion  on  our  north,  the  only  powers  who  could  do 
the  United  States  serious  injury,  in  case  of  war,  are  the 
European  powers.  The  acquisition  of  permanent  foot- 
holds by  those  powers,  on  this  hemisphere,  would  give 
them  a  basis  of  operations,  more  or  less  advantageous, 
against  us,  in  case  of  war.  Powerful  and  warlike  neigh- 
bors, with  political  interests  on  this  hemisphere,  would 
mean  for  the  United  States  a  system  akin  to  the  militarism 
of  Europe.  If  our  nation  believes  that  such  a  condition 
of  things  must  result  from  European  dominion  on  this 
hemisphere,  and  that  its  peace  and  safety-StnVeatened 
thereby,  why  is  it  not  justified  in  resisting  the  further 
extension  of  such  dominion?  Does  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
need  any  more  justification  than  does  the  doctrine  of  the 
"  balance  of  power  "  in  Europe? 

Did  not  Mr.  Canning  justify  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
and  was  not  this  what  he  meant  when  he  boasted:  "I 
called  the  New  World  into  existence,  to  redress  the 
balance  of  the  Old?" 

"The  balance  of  power"  is  justified  by  writers  on 
international  and  public  law,  on  the  ground  that  a  state 
has  a  right  to  protect  itself  from  anything  that  would 
endanger  its  peace  or  its  own  existence.  If  the  people 
of  this  country  believe  that  the  maintenance  of  the 


—  45  — 

Monroe  Doctrine  is  essential  to  their  peace,  welfare,  and 
safety,  and  they  have  the  power  to  maintain  it,  why  is 
not  their  position  equally  justifiable?  One  thing  is 
certain — our  southern  neighbors  have  not  complained 
of  it.  The  only  complaint  in  that  direction  is  that  they 
expect  too  much. 

From  the  foregoing  review,  it  must  be  evident,  as 
stated  in  the  beginning  of  this  essay,  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  of  to-day  is  a  more  comprehensive  doctrine 
than  that  originally  proclaimed  by  Monroe  ;  and  that 
those  who  would  confine  it  to  the  strict  letter  of  Monroe's 
message  are  in  error.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  of  to-day  is 
rather  the  underlying  spirit  of  the  original  declaration. 
I  cannot  better  summarize  its  scope  and  limitations  than 
by  quoting  the  summary  made  by  Richard  Henry  Dana, 
Jr.,  which  was  lately  amplified  by  Professor  John  B. 
McMaster,  and  published  in  the  New  York  Herald, 
about  the  time  of  the  Corinto  affair.  Here  it  is  : 

1.  It  must  be  remembered,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
'  declaration  on  which   Monroe,   in   1823,   consulted  his 

Cabinet  and  his  two  predecessors,  Jefferson  and  Madison, 
related  to  the  meddling  of  the  powers  of  Europe  in  the 
affairs  of  American  states. 

2.  That  the  kind  of  meddling  then  declared  against 
was  such  as  tended  to  control  the  political  affairs  of 
American  powers,  or  was  designed  to   extend  to  the 
New  World  the  political  systems  and  institutions  of  the 
Old. 

3.  That  the  declaration  did  not  mark  out  any  course 
of  conduct  to  be  pursued,  but  merely  asserted  that  the 
interposition  of  the  kind  mentioned  would  be  considered 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety,  and  as  a  manifesta- 
tion of  an  unfriendly  dispositon  toward  the  United  States. 

4.  That  this  doctrine  has  never  been  indorsed  by 


-46- 

any  resolution  or  act  of  Congress,  but  still  remains  the 
declaration  of  a  President  and  his  Cabinet. 

5.  Nevertheless,    it    is    an    eminently    proper    and 
patriotic  doctrine,  and  as  such  has  been  indorsed  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  and  needs  no  other  sanction. 
The  people,  not  Congress,  rule  this  country.     It  is  not 
of  the  smallest  consequence,  therefore,    whether   Con- 
gress ever  has  or  ever  does  indorse  the  doctrine  which 
very  fittingly  bears  the  name  of  the  first   President  to 
announce  it. 

6.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  simple  and  plain  state- 
ment that  the  people  of  the  United  States  oppose  the 
creation  of  European  dominion  on  American  soil ;  that 
they  oppose  the  transfer  of  the  political  sovereignty  of 
American  soil  to  European  powers,  and  that  any  attempt 
to  do  these  things  will  be  regarded  as   "dangerous  to 
our  peace  and  safety." 

What  the  remedy  should  be  for  such  interposition  by 
European  powers  the  doctrine  does  not  pretend  to  state. 
But  this  much  is  certain,  that  when  the  people  of  the 
United  States  consider  anything  "dangerous  to  their 
peace  and  safety  "  they  will  do  as  other  nations  do,  and, 
if  necessary,  defend  their  peace  and  safety  with  force 
of  arms. 

7.  The  doctrine  does  not  comtemplate  forcible  inter- 
vention by  the  United  States  in  any  legitimate  contest, 
but  it  will  not  permit  any  such  contest  to  result  in  the 
increase   of  European  power  or  influence  on  this  con- 
tinent, nor  in  the  overthrow  of  any  existing  government, 
nor  in  the  establishment  of  a  protectorate  over  it,  nor  in 
the  exercise  of  any  direct  control  over  its  policy  or  institu- 
tions.    Further  than  this  the  doctrine  does  not  go. 


—  47  — 

ADDENDUM. 

Much  history  has  been  made  in  connection  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  short  interval  since  the  foregoing 
paper  was  written. 

The  passage  by  Congress  of  the  Venezuelan  Boundary 
Commission  bill,  in  answer  to  the  President's  Venezuelan 
message  of  December  17,  1895,  is  a  virtual  sanction  by 
Congress  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Hereafter,  therefore, 
it  cannot  be  said,  as  it  could  have  been  said  until  the 
passage  of  that  bill,  that  the  doctrine  has  never  been 
sanctioned  by  the  American  Congress  in  both  branches. 

In  his  annual  message  to  Congress,  of  December  2, 
1895,  President  Cleveland  said,  that  "the  traditional 
and  established  policy  of  this  Government  is  firmly 
opposed  to  a  forcible  increase  by  any  European  power 
of  its  territorial  possessions  in  this  continent." 

As  the  action  of  England  towards  Venezuela,  which 
was  then  under  consideration,  would,  if  the  territory 
in  dispute  belonged  to  Venezuela,  amount  to  "a  forcible 
increase"  of  England's  territorial  possessions,  the  Presi- 
dent's language  is  suitable  and  appropriate  to  the  occa- 
sion; and  as  he  was  dealing  with  a  specific  case,  and 
was  not  attempting  to  give  a  comprehensive  definition 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  can  not  be  said  that  this 
statement  necessarily  involved  any  narrowing  of  the 
scope  of  the  doctrine,  as  now  understood.  It  is  often 
advisable  in  controversies  of  this  kind  not  to  state 
propositions  advanced  more  broadly  than  the  case  in 
hand  calls  for,  thereby  not  inviting,  and  perhaps  avoid- 
ing, unnecessary  disputation. 

But  in  his  message  of  December  17,  1895,  the  Presi- 
dent uses  this  language : 

"  Great  Britain's  present  proposition  has  never  thus 


far  been  regarded  as  admissible  by  Venezuela,  though 
any  adjustment  of  the  boundary  line  which  that  country 
may  deem  for  her  advantage,  and  may  enter  into  of  her 
own  free  will,  cannot,  of  course,  be  objected  to  by  the 
United  States." 

It  must  be  admitted  that,  on  broad  grounds,  the 
menace  to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  United  States 
involved  in  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  is 
scarcely  less  when  a  substantial  increase  of  European 
dominion  is  obtained  peaceably  than  when  it  is  obtained 
forcibly.  And,  at  first  blush,  the  foregoing  statement 
in  the  Venezuelan  message  would  seem  to  imply  that 
a  peaceful  acquisition  of  territory  would  be  tolerated. 

We  find,  also,  such  an  authority  as  Senator  Sherman 
of  Ohio,  recently  made  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations,  declaring  that  the  Presi- 
dent's "assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  correct 
one";  and  there  has  been  very  little  dissent  from  this 
position  by  those  who  admit  the  applicability  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  Venezuela  case.  It  is  more  than 
likely  that  this  position  is  held  by  reason  of  the  peculiar 
nature  of  the  dispute  in  question.  The  position  is  doubt- 
less founded  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  bona  fide 
dispute  between  two  nations  whose  rights  to  adjoining 
territory  on  this  hemisphere  are  admissible  and  fully 
recognized.  But  if  Venezuela,  who  is  directly  and 
vitally  concerned  in  the  territory  in  dispute,  shall  volun- 
tarily, and  without  coercion,  consent  to  compromise  such 
dispute,  presumably  maintained  in  good  faith,  then  our 
Government  will  take  that  as  a  conclusive  proof  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  been  violated.  For  the  Presi- 
dent says  that  the  correspondence  with  England  was 
conducted  in  the  belief  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
involved  in  the  "pending  controversy"  ;  and  that 
"without  any  conviction  as  to  the  final  merits  of  the 


—  49  — 

dispute,  but  anxious  to  learn  in  a  satisfactory  and  con- 
clusive manner  whether  Great  Britain  sought,  under  a 
claim  of  boundary,  to  extend  her  possessions  on  this 
continent  without  right,  or  whether  she  merely  sought 
possession  of  territory  fairly  included  within  her  lines 
of  ownership,  this  Government  proposed  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  a  resort  to  arbitration  as  a  proper 
means  of  settling  the  question,  to  the  end  that  a  vexatious 
boundary  dispute  between  the  two  contestants  might  be 
determined,  and  our  exact  standing  and  relation  to  the 
controversy  might  be  made  clear." 

It  must  be  conceded  that  any  European  nation  owning 
territory  on  this  hemisphere  may,  in  perfect  good  faith, 
have  a  boundary  dispute  with  a  neighboring  American 
state;  and,  having  such  a  bona  fide  dispute,  may 
defend  its  position  to  the  uttermost.  To  say  that  such  a 
boundary  dispute,  when  existing  in  good  faith,  and  not 
trumped  up  by  the  European  state,  for  the  purpose  of 
wrongfully  acquiring  the  territory  of  the  American  state, 
cannot  be  settled,  even  if  the  immediate  parties  are 
willing  to  settle  it,  without  an  inquiry  on  our  part  as  to 
whether  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  involved,  would  doubt- 
less be  going  to  an  unnecessary  extreme  at  the  present 
time  in  the  assertion  of  that  Doctrine. 

In  the  Venezuela  correspondence  Lord  Salisbury 
claims  that  England  is  not  violating  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
In  reply  to  Mr.  Olney,  he  says  : 

"Her  Majesty's  Government  have  no  design  to  seize 
territory  that  properly  belongs  to  Venezuela,  or  forcibly 
to  extend  sovereignty  over  any  portion  of  her  popu- 
lation." 

He  also  says : 

"Her  Majesty's  Government  .  .  .  fully  concur 
with  the  view  which  President  Monroe  apparently  enter- 
tained, that  any  disturbance  of  the  existing  territorial 
distribution  in  that  hemisphere  by  any  fresh  acquisitions 


-5o  — 

on  the  part  of  any  European  state  would  be  a  highly 
inexpedient  change." 

But  he  denies  the  applicability  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  the  Venezuela  case,  and  bluntly  refuses  to  allow  an 
impartial  tribunal  to  pass  on  the  controversy.  Yet  if  it 
shall  appear,  on  an  impartial  investigation,  that  England 
is  making  fresh  acquisitions  of  Venezuela's  territory, 
why  is  not  the  doctrine  applicable?  England,  however, 
has  taken  the  position  that  she  will  keep  by  force  as 
much  of  the  disputed  territory  as  she  desires. 

As  Mr.  Olney  puts  the  case,  England's  position 
toward  Venezuela  may  be  stated  thus  : 

"You  can  get  none  of  the  debatable  land  by  force, 
because  you  are  not  strong  enough  ;  you  can  get  none  by 
treaty,  because  I  will  not  agree,  and  you  can  take  your 
chance  at  getting  a  portion  by  arbitration  only,  if  you 
first  agree  to  abandon  to  me  such  other  portion  as  I  may 
designate." 

Certainly  the  acquisition  of  territory  under  such 
circumstances  is  as  much  a  forcible  acquisition  as  if  the 
territory  were  taken  and  held  by  British  troops. 

The  President's  message,  in  view  of  its  approval  by 
Congress  and  the  people,  has  been  called  a  contingent 
declaration  of  war;  for  he  has  advised  Congress  that  when 
the  report  of  the  Commission  is  made  and  accepted,  it 
will,  in  his  opinion, — 

"be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  resist  by  every 
means  in  its  power  as  a  willful  aggression  upon  its  rights 
and  interests  the  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of  any 
lands  or  the  exercise  of  governmental  jurisdiction  over 
any  territory  which  after  investigation  we  have  deter- 
mined of  right  to  belong  to  Venezuela." 

While  these  are  strong  words,  and  may  mean  war  in 
a  contingency,  they  are  simply  a  reply  to  England's 
warlike  attitude,  which  can  only  mean  that  force  and 


not  justice  shall  decide  this  controversy.  England  has 
refused  the  peaceful  methods  of  an  impartial  judgment. 

Regardless  of  the  opinion  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  civilized  world,  she  says,  in  effect:  "  This  dispute  can 
only  be  settled  my  way,  or  by  war."  Her  attitude,  and 
not  ours,  is  a  challenge  to  war —  a  fact  that  is  misappre- 
hended by  some  of  our  own  people,  and  certainly  by  the 
press  and  people  of  Europe.  All  that  our  Government 
ever  asked  was  that  the  dispute  should  be  settled  by 
peaceful  means.  As  England  refused  to  be  a  party  to 
an  impartial  arbitration,  our  Government,  in  order  that  it 
might  take  further  action  only  if  the  facts  should  warrant 
us,  has  appointed  a  Commission  of  distinguished  men  to 
investigate  the  truth  about  the  matter. 

It  will  be  the  duty  of  that  Commission  to  find  out,  and 
to  inform  us  and  inform  the  world,  whether  England, 
relying  upon  her  superior  strength,  is  attempting  to  rob 
an  American  state  of  its  territory,  or  is  simply  defending 
in  a  reckless,  warlike,  and  uncivilized  manner  what  is 
justly  her  own. 

While  our  attitude  may  mean  war,  if  we  find  that 
England  is  despoiling  Venezuela,  and  she  shall  refuse  to 
desist,  yet  we  do  not  propose  to  prejudge  her  case;  and 
we  will  act  only  in  case  it  is  necessary  to  protect  our 
cherished  principles,  one  of  which  is  to  defend  from 
European  aggression  the  integrity  and  autonomy  of  the 
existing  free  states  on  the  American  hemisphere.  Such 
is  the  position  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  imposes  on  us. 
When  we  abandon  it,  we  will  lose  the  prestige  and  influ- 
ence which  it  gives  us  among  the  American  states  and 
before  the  world;  and  we  will  lose,  also,  much  of  the 
pride  arid  honor  which  Americans  feel  in  their  country. 

Would  not  peace  under  such  conditions  cost  too 
much  ? 


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